

{,S}ROS

Securing ROS over the wire, in the graph,
and through the kernel

By Ruffin White and Morgan Quigley

What is SROS?

“An addition to the ROS API and ecosystem to support modern cryptography and security measures”

Encryption

- Native TLS support for all socket level communication
- X.509 PKI certificates for chains of trust, authenticity and integrity
- Keyserver for key pair generation and certificate customisation

Access Control

- Definable namespace globbing for node restrictions and roles
- Audit graph network through security logs and events
- User constructed and/or auto trained access control policies

Process Profiles

- Harden node processes on using Linux Security Modules in kernel
- Quarantine a node's file, device, signal, and networking access
- Reusable AppArmor profile library for ROS



Why SROS?

“Robots provide a vector for cyber threats to manifest into real-world risks.”



ROS's clear text transport

- Packet Sniffing: *Confidentiality*
- Man-in-the-middle: *Integrity*

ROS's anonymous graphs

- Message Spoofing: *Identification*
- Rouge Nodes: *Authorization*

ROS's runtime process

- Code injection: *Compromised Execution*
- Zero Day Exploits: *Altered Permissions*

Relevant robotic sectors:

- Industrial Automation
- Autonomous Vehicles
- Home Automation
- Internet of Things, etc.



Why not use VPNs or SDNs?


Pros:

- Tunneling over distant networks
 - ROS allocates ports over runtime; ephemeral port firewall = *whack-a-mole*
- Professional routers and switches
 - Cryptographic overhead can be offloaded to dedicated hardware
- Existing Infrastructure
 - A mature technology; well documented and understood



Cons:

- Session Hijacking
 - ROS is still exposed to attacks from within the local network
- Stack Complexity
 - Additional system layers to configure and regulation
- Fine Grain Control
 - Difficult to integrate and segregate subdomains of ROS graph





CAUTION

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Encryption

X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

- DSA, RSA, Elliptic Curve Keysigning
- Leverage chains of trust to verify validity and authenticity

Transport Layer Security (TLS)

- Wrap XMLRPC and TCPROS communication
- Leverage socket encryption and privacy

Keyserver and Keystores

- API to auto generate and distribute ciphered key pairs
- Customize X.509 certificate extensions and attributes

The collage consists of four screenshots from a Linux desktop environment:

- Top-left:** A Wireshark packet capture showing TLS traffic. The selected packet is a TLSv2 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Certificate. The details pane shows the certificate structure, including the serial number, issuer, and subject.
- Top-right:** A window titled 'talker.topics.publisher' showing identity details. The identity is 'talker.topics.publisher', verified by 'master', and expires on 12/15/2020. There is a 'Details' button.
- Bottom-left:** A window titled 'root.pem' showing the details of a certificate. It includes the serial number, issuer, and subject. There is a 'Details' button.
- Bottom-right:** A window titled 'root.pem' showing the details of a private key. It includes the algorithm (RSA), size (4096), and fingerprints (SHA1, SHA256). There is a 'Details' button.

Access Control

Defining Namespaces Permissions


- Permit/exclude graph permissions via ROS namespaces
- Similar Apparmor globbing syntax using wildcards

Auditing and Security Logs

- Granular logging of access events and violation attempts
- Audit/deny ROS API usage with rule modifiers

Building Policies

- Auto-generate/train policies from demonstration or logs
- Human readable yaml, leverage variables & node anchors



```
policy_config.yaml
1 nodes:
2   /listener:
3     parameters:=
10  services:=
15  topics:
16    /chatter:
17      allow: s
18  /rosout:=
20  /roslaunch:
21    parameters:
22      /rostdistro:
23        allow: w
24      /roslaunch/uris*:
25        allow: w
26      /rosversion:
27        allow: w
28      /run_id:
29        allow: rw
30  /rosoutpy:
31    parameters:
32      /enable_statistics:
33        allow: r
34      /tcp_keepalive:
35        allow: r
36      /use sim time:
37        allow: r
38  services:
39    /rosoutpy/get_loggers:
40      allow: x
41    /rosoutpy/set_logger_level:
42      allow: x
43  topics:
44    /rosout:
45      allow: ps
46    /rosout_agg:
47      allow: p
48  /talker:
49    parameters:=
52  services:
53    /talker/get_loggers:
54      allow: x
55    /talker/set_logger_level:
56      allow: x
57  topics:
58    /chatter:
59      allow: p
60    /rosout:
61      allow: p
62  version: '0'
63
```

Encryption & Access Control Demo

<https://asciinema.org/a/88519>



```
/use_sim_time:
  allow: r
services:
  /rosoutpy/get_loggers:
    allow: x
  /rosoutpy/set_logger_level:
    allow: x
topics:
  /rosout:
    allow: ps
  /rosout_agg:
    allow: p
/talker:
  parameters:
    /use_sim_time:
      allow: r
  services:
    /talker/get_loggers:
      allow: x
    /talker/set_logger_level:
      allow: x
  topics:
    /chatter:
      allow: p
    /rosout:
      allow: p
version: '0'
```

(END)

u 16.04 0:-- 1:-* 2:- 3:-

6d16h 1.13 8x0.9GHz 31.3G26% 2016-10-08 21:17:05



Process Profiles

Linux Security Modules


- Leverage pre-existing kernel level security features
- AppArmor: easy to use and well documented

Quarantine ROS Process

- Limit node's file, device, signal and networking permissions
- Preemptively defend against zero day exploits

ROS Profile Library

- Quickly build custom profiles using ROS module primitives
- Includes minimal permissions necessary for core ROS features



```
roslaunch_talker_listener_profile
1 #include <tunables/global>
2 #include <tunables/ros>
3
4 profile ros/roslaunch @{ROS_INSTALL_BIN}/{,s}roslaunch {
5     #include <ros/nodes/roslaunch>
6
7     @{ROS_INSTALL_BIN}/roslaunch rix,
8 }
9
10 profile ros/rosmaster @{ROS_INSTALL_BIN}/rosmaster {
11     #include <ros/base>
12     #include <ros/node>
13     #include <ros/python>
14
15     @{ROS_INSTALL_BIN}/rosmaster rix,
16 }
17
18 profile ros/roscore @{ROS_INSTALL_BIN}/{,s}roscore {
19     #include <ros/nodes/roslaunch>
20
21     @{HOME}/.rnd r,
22     @{ROS_INSTALL_BIN}/roslaunch rix,
23     @{ROS_INSTALL_BIN}/{,s}roscore rix,
24 }
25
26 profile ros/rosout @{ROS_INSTALL_LIB}/rosout {
27     #include <ros/base>
28     #include <ros/node>
29 }
```

Process Profiles Demo

<https://asciinema.org/a/88531>



```
11e6-9384-0242f3d4820e/roslaunch-dox-3294.log
Checking log directory for disk usage. This may take a
while.
Press Ctrl-C to interrupt
Done checking log file disk usage. Usage is <1GB.

started roslaunch server http://dox:33635/
ros_comm version 1.12.5

SUMMARY
=====

PARAMETERS
* /rostdistro: kinetic
* /rosversion: 1.12.5

NODES

auto-starting new master
process[master]: started with pid [3315]
ROS_MASTER_URI=http://dox:11311/

setting /run_id to ac9ad40c-8da8-11e6-9384-0242f3d4
820e
process[rosout-1]: started with pid [3328]
started core service [/rosout]
```

```
ruffsl@dox:~$ /opt/ros/kinetic/share/rospy/tutorial
s/001_talker_listener/listener.py
```

```
ruffsl@dox:~$
```

TODO:

SROS related REPs

- PKI practices, register OIDs, extensions

More client libraries and transports

- roscpp, rosjava; UDPROS, etc

Harden all Master & Slave API calls



- Check caller privilege/identity of before response

Tests and code coverage

- Unit Test all the things!

Abstract security modules as plugins

- Allow user to define custom policy evaluation plugins



A tip of the hat to OSRF & CogRob



“...to support the development, distribution, and adoption of open source software for use in robotics research, education, and product development.”



“...to advance contextual robotics through relevant grand challenge research, to educate and train students who are prepared to catalyze future developments in robotics; and to provide the talent and innovation to establish San Diego as a leading robotics hub.”

Resources

SROS Documentation:


- wiki.ros.org/SROS

SROS Docker Image:

- hub.docker.com/r/osrf/sros

More about me:

- about.me/ruffin



Questions for Section {S}ROS?